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Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,
71 F.3D 77 (2D Cm. 1995).
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, three professional sculptors known as the "Three-J's" ("Plaintiffs"),
brought an action to prevent the alteration and destruction of their sculpture
installed in Defendant's commercial building. Defendant Helmsley-Spear, Inc.
("Defendant"), the owner and manager of the building filed a counterclaim for
waste. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from altering, removing, or
destroying the sculpture. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that: (1) the district court did not err in determining that
some parts of the sculpture were separate works of art while the remainder constituted a single interrelated work of art; (2) although some elements of the
sculpture were fixed to the floor, walls and ceiling of the lobby, the sculpture
was not "applied art;" and (3) the sculpture installed was a "work made for hire"
and, thus, was not protected from destruction or modification under the Visual
Artists Rights Act.' Consequently, the Second Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part.
FACTS

In 1991, the management company of a commercial building in Queens, New
York, entered into an agreement with Plaintiffs "to design, create and install
sculpture and other permanent installations" in the building, primarily in the
lobby.2 Plaintiffs were given "full authority in design, color and style" and were
to retain the copyrights to their work, while the management company was to
3
receive fifty percent of any proceeds from its exploitation.
Plaintiffs' artwork was a very large "walk-through sculpture" occupying most
of the building's lobby. The work consisted of a variety of recycled material,
mostly metal, affixed to the walls and the ceiling. In addition, a vast mosaic was
made from pieces of recycled glass embedded in the walls and floor.
The management company's lease was terminated in 1994, and one week
later, it filed for bankruptcy. As a result, Defendant took over management of the
property and informed Plaintiffs that they could no longer install the artwork in
the building and ordered Plaintiffs to vacate the property. In addition, Defendant
made statements suggesting that it intended to remove the artwork already in
place in the lobby.
Hence, Plaintiffs brought an action to prevent the removal of the sculpture.

1. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1991).
2. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. Id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

1

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 16

DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. VI:317

The district court issued a permanent restraining order enjoining Defendant from
altering, removing, defacing or destroying the artwork installed in the building.
The injunction was to remain in effect for the lifetimes of the three plaintiffs.
The court dismissed Defendant's cross-complaint for waste and Plaintiff's cause
of action for tortious interference with contractual relations. Both parties appealed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

Before examining the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"), the Second Circuit briefly reviewed the concept of artists' moral rights and the history
and development of those rights in American jurisprudence. Moral rights were
meant to capture those rights of an ethereal, individual and non-economic nature
that arise from the belief that "an artist in the process of creation injects his
spirit into the work and that the artist's personality, as well as the integrity of the
work, should therefore be preserved."'
The court recognized that although moral rights encompass many different
rights, two rights, in particular, are protected by jurisdictions recognizing moral
rights - attribution and integrity. The "right of attribution" includes the right of
an artist to be accredited by name as creator of his work or to remain anonymous, the right to prevent the creator's work from being attributed to someone
else, and the right to prohibit the use of the creator's name on works created by
others.5 The "right of integrity," on the other hand, allows the creator to impede
any deforming or mutilating changes to the work, even after the title has been
transferred.6 In some jurisdictions, the latter right also protects the work from
complete destruction.7
The court recognized that federal and state courts typically acknowledge the
existence of such rights in other nations; however, they have resisted recognizing
moral rights in the United States. Notwithstanding this general apprehension to
endorse moral rights, American courts have in varying degrees acknowledged the
idea of moral rights by cloaking the concept in other legal theories such as
breach of contract, unfair competition, copyright, invasion of privacy and defamation.
The court then examined the history of VARA. For years, the United States
debated whether it should join the Berne Convention,' the international agreement protecting artistic and literary works. After much debate, Congress finally

4. Id. at 81.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1991).
6. Id.
7. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).

8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art.
6(b)(i)(s), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986) (stating in relevant part,
"[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation').
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passed the Beme Convention Implementation Act of 1988, with the caveat that
the Convention neither expanded nor reduced any rights under federal, state or
common law to claim authorship of a work or to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of a work.
Two years later, Congress enacted VARA, which "protects both the reputa9
tions of certain visual artists and the works of art they create." VARA grants
three rights to the artist: (1) the "right of attribution;" (2) the "right of integrity;"
and (3) the "right to prevent destruction." This protection, however, only extends
to a narrow class of art which includes "paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures,
or photographs produced for exhibition purposes, existing in a single copy or
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer."'" VARA provides that copyright registration is not required to bring an action for infringement, and all remedies available under copyright law, other than criminal remedies, are available in an action
for infringement of moral rights.
After summarizing the history of moral rights and VARA, the court determined whether Plaintiffs' sculpture was a single piece of art, rather than separate
pieces to be considered individually. The district court had found, with a few
precise exceptions, that the art was a single work because each element was
combined with a previous piece in order to create a thematically-consistent work.
On appeal, Defendant's primary contention was that either every component was
part of a single work or every component was an individual work. The Second
Circuit determined that the district court's conclusion, that a few items of the
work were separate works while the remainder could constitute a single interrelated work of art, was an appropriate determination.
Next, the court examined whether Plaintiffs' sculpture was a "work of visual
art" under VARA. A work of "visual art" is defined as "a painting, drawing,
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy" or in a limited edition of 200 copies
or fewer." The court concluded that, considered as a whole, the work was a
sculpture and existed only as a single copy, thus satisfying the Act's definition of
visual art. The definition of visual art, however, excludes "any poster, map,
globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or
other audio-visual work."'" Congress' intent was to distinguish works of visual
art from other media, due to the different circumstances surrounding the creation
and dissemination of the different genres.
Defendant asserted that the work was applied art because some sculptural
elements were affixed to the walls, ceiling and floor of the lobby. Although
"applied art" is defined as "two- and three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects," the court stated that interpreting applied art to include such works as the one in the present case would
render meaningless VARA's protection of works installed in buildings. There-

9. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
10.
11.
12.
13.

17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A)(i).
17 U.S.C. § 101.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing KieseIstein-Cord v.
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fore, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court correctly ruled that the
work was a visual art, and not applied art.
Also excluded from the definition of a work of visual art is a "work made for
hire" which is defined as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment."' 4 The district court concluded that Plaintiffs were hired
as independent contractors and not employees and, thus, held that the work was
still visual art. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not define "employee" or "scope
of employment."' 5 Therefore, to determine if the work was produced for hire by
an employee rather than an independent contractor the court followed the Supreme Court's multi-factor balancing test used in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid. 6
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Reid test was the appropriate legal
test. However, it found that some of the district court's factual findings were
clearly erroneous and, as a result, held that the sculpture was a work for hire as
a matter of law. The Second Circuit noted that the district court properly identified that five factors would be relevant in nearly every case: (1) the right to
control the means and manner of production; (2) the essential skill required for
the execution of the project; (3) whether the hired party may be assigned additional projects; (4) tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) the provision of
employee benefits. 7
First, the Second Circuit found that the evidence strongly supported the conclusion that Plaintiffs controlled the manner and means of production. They had
complete artistic freedom with respect to every aspect of the sculpture. In addition, the court concluded that the execution of the work of art required great
skill. Therefore, the second factor weighed heavily in Plaintiffs' favor.
The court, however, disagreed with the district court's conclusion on the third
factor. The employment agreement clearly stated that Plaintiffs agreed to "render
such other related services and duties as may be assigned to [them] from time to
time by the Company."' 8 Thus, Defendant had a right to, and in fact did, assign
work other than the principal sculpture to Plaintiffs. The record showed that

Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1980)).

14. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
16. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, (490 U.S. 730 (1989)), the Supreme Court
designated thirteen specific factors to take into consideration in distinguishing between an employee
and an independent contractor. While all the factors are relevant, no one factor is meant to be determinative; rather, the factors are weighed with the particular facts of the case. The thirteen factors are:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the means and manner by which the work is completed; (2) the
skill required; (3) the source of the tools and supplies; (4) the location of the work; (5) the extent of
the relationship between the parties; (6) whether the hiring party has a right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long he/she
works; (8) the payment method; (9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party is in
business; (12) the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax treatment of the hired party. Id. at
751-752.
17. Carter,71 F.3d. at 86.
18. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss2/16

4

Pellicore: Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995)

1996]

CARTER v. HELMSLEY-SPEAR

Plaintiffs performed work on the sixth and eighth floors, as well as in the boiler
room. Thus, Plaintiffs were not hired solely to install the sculpture in the lobby.
This additional fact supported the conclusion that Plaintiffs were employees and
not independent contractors.
The court examined the other two factors, finding that the provision for employee benefits and the tax treatment weighed strongly in favor of "employee"
status. Defendant provided employee benefits to Plaintiffs such as health, life and
liability insurance, as well as paid vacations. In fact, two of the three artists filed
for unemployment benefits after they were terminated. In addition, Plaintiffs
were paid a weekly salary and agreed in their written contract to a forty-hour
work week. Furthermore, Defendant paid social security taxes. According to the
court, all of these facts suggested that Plaintiffs were employees and not independent contractors.
The court emphasized that its examination of the Reid factors was not meant
"to marginalize factors such as artistic freedom and skill."' 9 It also stressed that
the Reid test was fact dependent, and future cases would not always be able to
20
distinguish between employee and independent contractor status. The court
concluded that the Reid factors, properly weighed with the facts of the case,
were more than sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs were employees, and
therefore, the sculpture was a work made for hire as a matter of law. As a result,
the court held that the work fell outside the scope of VARA's protection.
CONCLUSION

In sum, the Second Circuit concluded that parts of a large sculpture, installed
in the lobby of a commercial building, were separate works while the remainder
constituted a distinct, interconnected work. Second, the court determined that the
sculpture was a "visual work of art" and not "applied art." Finally, after applying
the Reid factors, the court found that the factual record weighed in favor of
employee status and not independent contractor status. Therefore, the court concluded that the sculpture was a "work made for hire," and Plaintiffs were not
entitled to protection under VARA.
DeandraPellicore

19. Id. at 87.
20. Id.
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